{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-42769", "assignerOrgId": "3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "openssl", "dateReserved": "2026-04-29T09:22:27.969Z", "datePublished": "2026-06-09T16:03:28.999Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T07:48:06.084Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"affected": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "OpenSSL", "vendor": "OpenSSL", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.0.1", "status": "affected", "version": "4.0.0", "versionType": "semver"}, {"lessThan": "3.6.3", "status": "affected", "version": "3.6.0", "versionType": "semver"}, {"lessThan": "3.5.7", "status": "affected", "version": "3.5.0", "versionType": "semver"}, {"lessThan": "3.4.6", "status": "affected", "version": "3.4.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "reporter", "value": "Alex Gaynor (Anthropic)"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "Alex Gaynor (Anthropic)"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "Bob Beck"}], "datePublic": "2026-06-09T14:00:00.000Z", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "Issue Summary: An error in the callback used to verify the certificate<br>provided in a Root CA key update Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)<br>message response rendered the certificate validation ineffectual, which<br>could lead to escalation of credentials from the Registration Authority (RA)<br>level to the root Certification Authority (root CA) level.<br><br>Impact Summary: The Registration Autority could replace the root CA<br>certificate for the CMP clients with an arbitrary root CA certificate.<br><br>One of the parts of the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), specified in<br>RFC 9810, is Root Certification Authority (root CA) key Rollover,<br>which is sent by the server in a message with type 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate'.<br>As part of these messages, 'newWithOld' certificate, the new root CA<br>certificate signed with the old root CA key, is provided, and verifying its<br>signature is crucial for transferring the trust from the old CA key to the<br>new one.<br><br>The 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' messages are expected to be processed with<br>OSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(), that is expected to verify the 'newWithOld'<br>certificate. A typo in the certificate chain building code led to adding<br>an incorrect certificate ('newWithOld' instead of 'oldRoot') to the<br>certificate chain, rendering the certificate verification process ineffectual<br>(only the issuer name and the algorithm OIDs were verified by other parts<br>of the verification code).<br><br>An attacker who already has credentials that satisfy the CMP message<br>protection checks can generate a new key pair and use a crafted self-signed<br>certificate in its 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' CMP messages which affected CMP<br>clients would accept as a new trust anchor.<br><br>Significant preconditions for the attack (having valid RA-level credentials)<br>are the reason the issue was assigned Low severity.<br><br>The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is<br>outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."}], "value": "Issue Summary: An error in the callback used to verify the certificate\nprovided in a Root CA key update Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)\nmessage response rendered the certificate validation ineffectual, which\ncould lead to escalation of credentials from the Registration Authority (RA)\nlevel to the root Certification Authority (root CA) level.\n\nImpact Summary: The Registration Autority could replace the root CA\ncertificate for the CMP clients with an arbitrary root CA certificate.\n\nOne of the parts of the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), specified in\nRFC 9810, is Root Certification Authority (root CA) key Rollover,\nwhich is sent by the server in a message with type 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate'.\nAs part of these messages, 'newWithOld' certificate, the new root CA\ncertificate signed with the old root CA key, is provided, and verifying its\nsignature is crucial for transferring the trust from the old CA key to the\nnew one.\n\nThe 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' messages are expected to be processed with\nOSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(), that is expected to verify the 'newWithOld'\ncertificate. A typo in the certificate chain building code led to adding\nan incorrect certificate ('newWithOld' instead of 'oldRoot') to the\ncertificate chain, rendering the certificate verification process ineffectual\n(only the issuer name and the algorithm OIDs were verified by other parts\nof the verification code).\n\nAn attacker who already has credentials that satisfy the CMP message\nprotection checks can generate a new key pair and use a crafted self-signed\ncertificate in its 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' CMP messages which affected CMP\nclients would accept as a new trust anchor.\n\nSignificant preconditions for the attack (having valid RA-level credentials)\nare the reason the issue was assigned Low severity.\n\nThe FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is\noutside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."}], "metrics": [{"format": "other", "other": {"content": {"text": "Low"}, "type": "https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/security-policy/"}}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-295", "description": "CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5", "shortName": "openssl", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T07:48:06.084Z"}, "references": [{"name": "OpenSSL Advisory", "tags": ["vendor-advisory"], "url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt"}, {"name": "4.0.1 git commit", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d531f21c0fe99067a66fc0ff1161ef127f9cd70b"}, {"name": "3.6.3 git commit", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d35cd473a271bf3ce7bf3d32af53217fb83ae92c"}, {"name": "3.5.7 git commit", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/54d0989997e5fc26057009a9782c3441ce3842fb"}, {"name": "3.4.6 git commit", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/777b363b16fcf2153bb3ded39dc3838713667c44"}], "source": {"discovery": "UNKNOWN"}, "title": "Trust-Anchor Substitution via cert/issuer Typo in CMP rootCaKeyUpdate", "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 5.3, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}}, {"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-06-09T19:38:00.495097Z", "id": "CVE-2026-42769", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-09T19:38:05.632Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 5.3, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}}, {"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2026-42769", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-06-09T19:38:00.495097Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-09T19:37:50.572Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "Trust-Anchor Substitution via cert/issuer Typo in CMP rootCaKeyUpdate", "source": {"discovery": "UNKNOWN"}, "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "reporter", "value": "Alex Gaynor (Anthropic)"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "Alex Gaynor (Anthropic)"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "Bob Beck"}], "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/security-policy/", "content": {"text": "Low"}}, "format": "other"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "OpenSSL", "product": "OpenSSL", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "4.0.0", "lessThan": "4.0.1", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.6.0", "lessThan": "3.6.3", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.5.0", "lessThan": "3.5.7", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.4.0", "lessThan": "3.4.6", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "datePublic": "2026-06-09T14:00:00.000Z", "references": [{"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt", "name": "OpenSSL Advisory", "tags": ["vendor-advisory"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d531f21c0fe99067a66fc0ff1161ef127f9cd70b", "name": "4.0.1 git commit", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d35cd473a271bf3ce7bf3d32af53217fb83ae92c", "name": "3.6.3 git commit", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/54d0989997e5fc26057009a9782c3441ce3842fb", "name": "3.5.7 git commit", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/777b363b16fcf2153bb3ded39dc3838713667c44", "name": "3.4.6 git commit", "tags": ["patch"]}], "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Issue Summary: An error in the callback used to verify the certificate\nprovided in a Root CA key update Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)\nmessage response rendered the certificate validation ineffectual, which\ncould lead to escalation of credentials from the Registration Authority (RA)\nlevel to the root Certification Authority (root CA) level.\n\nImpact Summary: The Registration Autority could replace the root CA\ncertificate for the CMP clients with an arbitrary root CA certificate.\n\nOne of the parts of the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), specified in\nRFC 9810, is Root Certification Authority (root CA) key Rollover,\nwhich is sent by the server in a message with type 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate'.\nAs part of these messages, 'newWithOld' certificate, the new root CA\ncertificate signed with the old root CA key, is provided, and verifying its\nsignature is crucial for transferring the trust from the old CA key to the\nnew one.\n\nThe 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' messages are expected to be processed with\nOSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(), that is expected to verify the 'newWithOld'\ncertificate. A typo in the certificate chain building code led to adding\nan incorrect certificate ('newWithOld' instead of 'oldRoot') to the\ncertificate chain, rendering the certificate verification process ineffectual\n(only the issuer name and the algorithm OIDs were verified by other parts\nof the verification code).\n\nAn attacker who already has credentials that satisfy the CMP message\nprotection checks can generate a new key pair and use a crafted self-signed\ncertificate in its 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' CMP messages which affected CMP\nclients would accept as a new trust anchor.\n\nSignificant preconditions for the attack (having valid RA-level credentials)\nare the reason the issue was assigned Low severity.\n\nThe FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is\noutside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "Issue Summary: An error in the callback used to verify the certificate<br>provided in a Root CA key update Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)<br>message response rendered the certificate validation ineffectual, which<br>could lead to escalation of credentials from the Registration Authority (RA)<br>level to the root Certification Authority (root CA) level.<br><br>Impact Summary: The Registration Autority could replace the root CA<br>certificate for the CMP clients with an arbitrary root CA certificate.<br><br>One of the parts of the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), specified in<br>RFC 9810, is Root Certification Authority (root CA) key Rollover,<br>which is sent by the server in a message with type 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate'.<br>As part of these messages, 'newWithOld' certificate, the new root CA<br>certificate signed with the old root CA key, is provided, and verifying its<br>signature is crucial for transferring the trust from the old CA key to the<br>new one.<br><br>The 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' messages are expected to be processed with<br>OSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(), that is expected to verify the 'newWithOld'<br>certificate. A typo in the certificate chain building code led to adding<br>an incorrect certificate ('newWithOld' instead of 'oldRoot') to the<br>certificate chain, rendering the certificate verification process ineffectual<br>(only the issuer name and the algorithm OIDs were verified by other parts<br>of the verification code).<br><br>An attacker who already has credentials that satisfy the CMP message<br>protection checks can generate a new key pair and use a crafted self-signed<br>certificate in its 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' CMP messages which affected CMP<br>clients would accept as a new trust anchor.<br><br>Significant preconditions for the attack (having valid RA-level credentials)<br>are the reason the issue was assigned Low severity.<br><br>The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is<br>outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-295", "description": "CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5", "shortName": "openssl", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T07:48:06.084Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-42769", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T07:48:06.084Z", "dateReserved": "2026-04-29T09:22:27.969Z", "assignerOrgId": "3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5", "datePublished": "2026-06-09T16:03:28.999Z", "assignerShortName": "openssl"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Issue Summary: An error in the callback used to verify the certificate\nprovided in a Root CA key update Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)\nmessage response rendered the certificate validation ineffectual, which\ncould lead to escalation of credentials from the Registration Authority (RA)\nlevel to the root Certification Authority (root CA) level.\n\nImpact Summary: The Registration Autority could replace the root CA\ncertificate for the CMP clients with an arbitrary root CA certificate.\n\nOne of the parts of the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), specified in\nRFC 9810, is Root Certification Authority (root CA) key Rollover,\nwhich is sent by the server in a message with type 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate'.\nAs part of these messages, 'newWithOld' certificate, the new root CA\ncertificate signed with the old root CA key, is provided, and verifying its\nsignature is crucial for transferring the trust from the old CA key to the\nnew one.\n\nThe 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' messages are expected to be processed with\nOSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(), that is expected to verify the 'newWithOld'\ncertificate. A typo in the certificate chain building code led to adding\nan incorrect certificate ('newWithOld' instead of 'oldRoot') to the\ncertificate chain, rendering the certificate verification process ineffectual\n(only the issuer name and the algorithm OIDs were verified by other parts\nof the verification code).\n\nAn attacker who already has credentials that satisfy the CMP message\nprotection checks can generate a new key pair and use a crafted self-signed\ncertificate in its 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' CMP messages which affected CMP\nclients would accept as a new trust anchor.\n\nSignificant preconditions for the attack (having valid RA-level credentials)\nare the reason the issue was assigned Low severity.\n\nThe FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is\noutside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."}], "id": "CVE-2026-42769", "lastModified": "2026-06-10T08:16:24.027", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.3, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 1.6, "impactScore": 3.6, "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "type": "Secondary"}]}, "published": "2026-06-09T17:17:08.377", "references": [{"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/54d0989997e5fc26057009a9782c3441ce3842fb"}, {"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/777b363b16fcf2153bb3ded39dc3838713667c44"}, {"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d35cd473a271bf3ce7bf3d32af53217fb83ae92c"}, {"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d531f21c0fe99067a66fc0ff1161ef127f9cd70b"}, {"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt"}], "sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-295"}], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}