In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.
data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.
Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always
carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are
unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded
and is left untouched.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendors | Products |
|---|---|
| Linux |
|
Configuration 1 [-]
|
No data.
References
History
Thu, 13 Aug 2026 18:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-129 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:-:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Mon, 03 Aug 2026 20:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-122 |
Thu, 30 Jul 2026 04:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-122 |
Wed, 29 Jul 2026 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-787 | |
| References |
|
Sat, 25 Jul 2026 09:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched. | |
| Title | Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published: 2026-07-25T08:49:19.416Z
Updated: 2026-08-17T04:52:27.750Z
Reserved: 2026-07-19T15:36:31.776Z
Link: CVE-2026-64273
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-07-25T10:17:07.660
Modified: 2026-08-17T05:17:26.330
Link: CVE-2026-64273
Redhat