In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
History

Tue, 18 Aug 2026 15:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-119
CWE-193
CWE-20

Tue, 18 Aug 2026 12:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-125
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate


Sat, 15 Aug 2026 20:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-119
CWE-193
CWE-20

Sat, 15 Aug 2026 06:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
Title ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published: 2026-08-15T05:55:19.786Z

Updated: 2026-08-17T05:12:03.913Z

Reserved: 2026-08-09T03:40:39.918Z

Link: CVE-2026-72300

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-15T06:22:02.690

Modified: 2026-08-17T06:18:32.993

Link: CVE-2026-72300

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-08-15T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-72300 - Bugzilla