In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the descriptor count: rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) - RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD); arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1); For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to 0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !arr check, and desc = arr + 64 is then dereferenced in the loop -> out-of-bounds write / panic. Clamp rep_max_zones to devip->nr_zones. The loop already stops at sdebug_capacity (after nr_zones zones), so a report can never hold more than nr_zones descriptors; the clamp does not change the report, it only bounds arr_len to (nr_zones + 1) * RZONES_DESC_HD, a real device property that can never reach 0x100000000.
History

Sun, 23 Aug 2026 13:15:00 +0000


Wed, 19 Aug 2026 16:45:00 +0000


Tue, 18 Aug 2026 03:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-665
CWE-788

Tue, 18 Aug 2026 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-787
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

threat_severity

Moderate


Mon, 17 Aug 2026 06:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Sat, 15 Aug 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-665
CWE-788

Sat, 15 Aug 2026 12:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the descriptor count: rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) - RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD); arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1); For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to 0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !arr check, and desc = arr + 64 is then dereferenced in the loop -> out-of-bounds write / panic. Clamp rep_max_zones to devip->nr_zones. The loop already stops at sdebug_capacity (after nr_zones zones), so a report can never hold more than nr_zones descriptors; the clamp does not change the report, it only bounds arr_len to (nr_zones + 1) * RZONES_DESC_HD, a real device property that can never reach 0x100000000.
Title scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published: 2026-08-15T12:27:07.504Z

Updated: 2026-08-23T12:47:20.125Z

Reserved: 2026-08-15T05:44:03.902Z

Link: CVE-2026-74470

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-15T13:17:51.727

Modified: 2026-08-23T13:16:43.967

Link: CVE-2026-74470

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-08-15T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-74470 - Bugzilla